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Abstract Tree thinking is an integral part of modern
evolutionary biology, and a necessary precondition for
phylogenetics and comparative analyses. Tree thinking has
during the 20th century largely replaced group thinking,
developmental thinking and anthropocentricism in biology.
Unfortunately, however, this does not imply that tree
thinking can be taken for granted. The findings reported
here indicate that tree thinking is very much an acquired
ability which needs extensive training. I tested a sample of
undergraduate and graduate students of biology by means
of questionnaires. Not a single student was able to correctly
interpret a simple tree drawing. Several other findings
demonstrate that tree thinking is virtually absent in students
unless they are explicitly taught how to read evolutionary
trees. Possible causes and implications of this mental bias
are discussed. It seems that biological textbooks can be an
important source of confusion for students. While group
and developmental thinking have disappeared from most
textual representations of evolution, they have survived in
the evolutionary tree drawings of many textbooks. It is
quite common for students to encounter anthropocentric
trees and even trees containing stem groups and paraphyla.
While these biases originate from the unconscious
philosophical assumptions made by authors, the findings
suggest that presenting unbiased evolutionary trees in
biological publications is not merely a philosophical virtue
but has also clear practical implications.
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Introduction
Modern evolutionary biology relies on population thinking
and tree thinking (O’Hara 1997). Both ways of thinking
have replaced earlier philosophies that turned out to be
incompatible with the empirical basis (Hull 1965; Sim-
berloff 1980; Sober 1980). The transition from essentialism
to population thinking has been described by Ernst Mayr
(1988, 1996; but see Levit and Meister 2006; Winsor
2003). This transition followed directly from the Darwinian
revolution (Darwin 1859): it is organisms with unique trait
combinations that make up populations, that constitute
biodiversity, and that are the basis of evolutionary change.
The earlier paradigm, which viewed organisms as blue-
prints of unchangeable essences, was incompatible with
these observations.
Equally important to modern biology is tree thinking.
Each and every species occupies one specific place in the
tree of life. Consequently all species have shared certain
parts of their history with all other living and extinct spe-
cies. The degree to which this history has been shared,
allows us to predict the extent and way in which species
differ from and resemble each other. A description of
biodiversity is impossible or at least incomplete without
taking this knowledge into account. It is necessary both for
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the idiographic activity of reconstructing evolutionary
relationships between species, and for the nomothetic
activity of testing hypotheses about biological laws of
nature (Ghiselin 1997; Hull 1999). Phylogenetic recon-
struction (Felsenstein 2004) and the comparative method
(Martins and Hansen 1996) are thus entirely unthinkable
without tree thinking.
Tree thinking became widely accepted somewhat later
than population thinking, as it can be said to have origi-
nated with phylogenetic systematics (Hennig 1950).
However, this does not mean that tree thinking has super-
seded population thinking (O’Hara 1997). Both
perspectives are compatible, and both are necessary in
biology today. As Robert O’Hara (1997) has shown, what
has been replaced by tree thinking, are the earlier para-
digms of group thinking and developmental thinking in
evolutionary biology. Group thinking had equated sys-
tematics with classification, i.e. it perceived taxonomic
groups as units that could be defined rather than entities
that had to be discovered. Group thinking thus represented
essentialism in systematics, because it failed to understand
that taxa are evolving entities and thus, ontologically
speaking, individuals (Ghiselin 1974, 1997; Hull 1976).
Developmental thinking, on the other hand, had assumed
that organic evolution was a teleological process (Ghiselin
2002; Hull 1974; Mayr 1988). It was thus based upon the
ancient idea that change in nature has an ultimate goal.
This is incompatible with the irregular and divergent nature
of evolution.
One might presume that the replacement of group and
developmental thinking by tree thinking is of merely his-
torical interest—a subject to be dealt with by historians of
science, just as the replacement of essentialism by popu-
lation thinking. To the contrary, I here argue that the
transition of both group thinking and developmental
thinking to tree thinking is still happening, and that it
deserves more attention by those who teach phylogenetics
and who communicate phylogenies. The transition is still
happening in the sense that students of biology have to
accomplish it in the course of their ‘‘academic ontogenies’’:
tree thinking is an ability that has to be acquired and cannot
be taken for granted by teachers. Sadly, many text books
indirectly and implicitly promote developmental thinking.
This further aggravates the problem. Given the importance
(even necessity) of tree thinking in order to fully appreciate
the meaning of evolutionary results, this problem deserves
attention.
Materials and methods
I devised a short questionnaire which was handed out
during the first lesson in several classes of a university
course in systematics and evolution (at Universitetet i
Tromsø, Norway). The course was intended for students
who had studied biology for several terms, but this was not
a formal requirement. The students who followed normal
progression had been taught evolutionary principles and
processes in earlier courses. The same questionnaire was
used in a similar course at a regional university college
(Høgskolen i Bodø, Norway). The students were asked to
answer the questions, using the time they needed, and were
assured anonymity. They did not have access to any books
or notes.
The questions (and correct answers) were:
1. ‘‘Given the following evolutionary tree [reproduced in
Fig. 1], where letters symbolise species: which species
is (are) most closely related to species B?’’1(The
correct answer was ‘‘C, D, E and F’’.)
2. ‘‘How many classes of vertebrates and angiosperms
are there? Fill in the scientifically correct
answer:...‘‘(There is no scientifically correct answer
to this question.)
3. ‘‘What are the differences between species and genera,
or between orders and classes? Give one or more
keywords that describe these differences. (a) Differ-
ences between species and genera:...(b) Differences
Fig. 1 Example phylogeny, where letters symbolise species. Not a
single student (n = 31) was able to give the correct answer to the
question ‘‘which species is/are most closely related to species B’’
1 Question (1) might require some linguistic explanations. The
original question was ‘‘Gitt det følgende stamtreet der bokstaver
symboliserer arter, hvilke(n) art(er) er i nærmest slekt med art B?’’ In
Norwegian, ‘‘which species’’ has different endings in the singular and
plural (while the verb does not, ‘‘er’’ = ‘‘is/are’’). It was important
not to imply in the question that the correct answer consisted of either
one species or several species. Therefore, ‘‘hvilke(n) art(er)’’ is a
combination of singular (‘‘hvilken art’’) and plural (‘‘hvilke arter’’).
Furthermore, ‘‘most closely related’’ is a quite imperfect translation of
‘‘i nærmest slekt’’. The Norwegian phrase implies a kinship or
genealogical relation (comparable to the German ‘‘verwandt’’). The
English ‘‘related’’ is wider and also incorporates abstract relationships
such as whole–part, group–element or simply similarities of any kind.
The Norwegian word does not normally have these figurative
connotations.
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between orders and classes:...‘‘(The correct answer
was that species differ from genera [and orders and
classes], for instance by being populations within
which gene flow can occur. The difference between
orders and classes is merely one of definition, none of
nature.)
4. ‘‘What does the ‘tree of life’ look like? Please draw the
evolutionary tree which describes the relationships
between groups of organisms. Include as many groups
as you are able to recall’’.
Results
Twenty one university students returned questionnaires that
were at least partly answered. On average they had previ-
ously taken biology courses for 1.6 years of full time study
load (median 1.5, range 0.3–4.0 years). Four were graduate
students, the remainder were undergraduates. A further ten
students of the regional university college returned the
questionnaire.
Not a single correct answer was given to question 1. In
most cases, species A (cf. Fig. 1) was the whole answer or
part of the answer (17 of 20 university students, and 8 of 9
college students).
Of 20 answers to question 2, 18 consisted of numbers.
One student entered strokes, and 1 left the answers blank.
In response to question 3, 5 of 18 respondents answered
that species were fundamentally different from genera,
while there was no such difference for orders and classes.
The remainder answered that there was no important dif-
ferences at all (n = 8) or that there were important
differences between both species and genera, and between
orders and classes (n = 5).
As an answer to question 4, 20 university students
produced a drawing, however, 7 of them did not enter any
names, and 1 entered one name only. The remainder pro-
vided between 4 and 23 taxon names. See Fig. 2 for an
example.
Seven of 13 students depicted 1 to 9 extant taxa as stem
groups in their drawings. A total of 14% of all names
provided were drawn as stem taxa. 11 of 13 students drew 1
to 11 branches which they named with paraphyletic groups.
A total of 31% of all names provided referred to paraphyla.
As regards the placement of our own species, or the taxon
containing Homo sapiens, the placement of our taxon
seemed arbitrary in four drawings, and in two cases no names
provided referred to taxa that contained our species. Our
taxon was placed at top of the drawing in five cases, and at
the outermost position in two cases. This means that 7 of 13
respondents gave a special position to our taxon. Counting
the number of nodes at which the path to H. sapiens leads to
the uttermost or uppermost position, a continuous ‘‘human
utterness score’’ can be calculated (Sandvik 2008). Com-
bined for the eleven drawings to which it was applicable, the
average score was 0.90 (43 of 48 nodes), which is highly
significantly biased in favour of man (P \ 10-8).
The resolution of the tree also favoured our species. I
calculated scores of the relative attention the tree drawings
devoted to three species, viz. H. sapiens (Mammalia),
Vanessa atalanta (Lepidoptera) and Veronica fruticans
(Lamiales), in the following manner: a score of 1 was
assigned if the species was named, of 2 if at least the
‘‘order’’ was named, of 3 if at least the ‘‘class’’ was named,
of 4 if at least the ‘‘phylum’’ was named, of 5 if a higher
taxon was named, and of 6 if no named branch contained
the species. The average attention score was 3.6 ± 1.5
(SD) for man, 4.8 ± 1.2 for the butterfly, and 4.6 ± 1.3 for
the flower. A one-tailed Wilcoxon two-sample tests
showed that man received more attention than the other
two species (W = 155.5, P \ 10-5). If using the ‘‘human
attention score’’ defined elsewhere (Sandvik 2008), a
continuous measure that expresses the degree to which tree
resolution favours our own species, the average for the 13
tree drawings was 0.60, which is highly significantly biased
in favour of man (P \ 10-4).
Discussion
O’Hara (1997:327) remarked that ‘‘beginning students in
biology should be taught how to read trees [...] just as
Fig. 2 Phylogenetic tree drawn by a university student. The question
posed was ‘‘What does the ‘tree of life’ look like? Please draw the
evolutionary tree which describes the relationships between groups of
organisms. Include as many groups as you remember’’. Note the
prominent position of mammals and the unresolved ‘‘side branches’’.
Taxon names provided by the student were translated verbatim into
English, the drawing itself is unchanged
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beginning students in geography need to be taught how to
read maps’’. My findings drastically support this opinion.
None of the undergraduate or graduate students in my
(admittedly small) sample was able to correctly interpret a
simple cladogram (Fig. 1). The cladogram was certainly
not the first evolutionary tree that the students had met,
since most had studied biology for several terms, including
introductory courses in evolutionary biology.
It does not require many sentences to explain how a
cladogram should be read. The concept of evolutionary
relatedness is not hard to grasp once it is explained. If it is
not, however, erroneous conceptions seem to be able to
survive for several years during prospective biologists’
educational careers. At the end of my course all university
students were able to give correct interpretations of clado-
grams. Matters differed for the students of the regional
university college. These students were asked which of the
small cladograms in Fig. 3b–i were compatible with the
large cladogram (Fig. 3a). This latter question was posed
after the meaning of cladograms had been explained and
after a considerable amount of time had been spent prac-
ticing the reading of cladograms. Still, only one answer out
of fourteen correctly identified all of the three compatible
cladograms. The remainder failed to identify at least one
compatible cladogram and/or indicated at least one
incompatible tree as compatible. This sobering result might
be related to the fact that many of the college students
simply needed some biology courses in order to study, e.g.
fishery. They might thus not have been genuinely interested
in biology per se, so that these findings would need to be
replicated with university students. Still, it is independent
evidence that reading cladograms is very much an acquired
ability rather than one that can be presupposed.
In their answers, the students proved to pay more
attention to how the taxon names at the tree tips were
ordered along the left–right axis, than to the topology of the
cladogram. Given that the information of cladograms is
conveyed in the branching order of taxa, while the left–
right ordering is arbitrary, this wrong focus necessarily
leads to wrong conclusions.
The main problem is presumably that students simply
have not been taught how to read cladograms. Teachers
may often assume that cladograms are self-explicatory
graphic devices to illustrate phylogenetic relationships,
when in fact their interpretation is not trivial. As Halstead
(1978:760) put it: ‘‘Cladograms are difficult enough for
experts in the field to comprehend fully’’. Ironically, what
he was advocating as the obvious alternative was phylo-
grams—which were meant to not only express
phylogenetic relationships, but, in addition, phenotypic
similarity, distribution through geologic time and species
number. As such, phylograms are not only harder to
interpret for untrained readers than cladograms. They may
also convey incorrect information on any one of the aspects
because they represent a two-dimensional compromise of
several multidimensional measures.
Regrettably, the presentation of systematics in text
books has been lagging behind the cutting edge of sys-
tematic research by several decades. It is thus only quite
recently that most biological text books have replaced
phylograms with cladograms. A less appreciated fact is that
even displaying cladograms does not guarantee that the
information provided is unbiased, as many cladograms are
drawn in an anthropocentric fashion (Sandvik 2008). It
might thus well be that one source of confusion for students
is the ambiguity of evolutionary tree drawings in text
books. Drawings of evolutionary trees cannot be clearer
than their authors’ thoughts about evolutionary processes.
And the latter have long been rather muddled, as can be
exemplified by the occurrence of ‘‘stem groups’’ in many
text book trees (e.g. Villee et al. 1984: Fig. 19.6; Willmer
1990: Fig. 14.2, which has even been reprinted by a
number of other text books). However, stem groups have
never existed in nature. A taxon above the species level
cannot possibly give rise to other taxa—nor to anything
else (Ghiselin 1997). One might say, therefore, that stem
groups are just another way of expressing (or, worse still,
trying to hide) ignorance. That some taxonomists have
chosen to even give scientific names to their ignorance (e.g.
‘‘Procoelomata’’; Bergstro¨m 1989), does not really make
the matter more transparent for biologists under education.
No wonder, then, that stem groups occurred in 54% of the
student drawings.
One problem is thus that many tree drawings which
students meet during their studies are biased and thereby
distort the evolutionary understanding of their readers.
Another is that this distorted understanding even impinges
on the interpretation of correctly drawn phylogenetic trees.
In other words, both problems re-enforce each other. I have
demonstrated elsewhere that even cladograms in phyloge-
netic text books are biased in an anthropocentric way
(Sandvik 2008). In terms of ordering of taxa and differ-
ential resolution of branches, otherwise correct cladograms
may distort the understanding of evolution. These findings
make the evidence presented here even more alarming: If
taxa are ordered in an anthropocentric manner in most
cladograms, and if students rely more on ordering than
topology, this affects the interpretation of relationships.
The taxon containing our own species is most often placed
in the rightmost position in cladograms (Sandvik 2008).
This can be illustrated with Fig. 4, which displays the
phylogeny of Osteognathostomata in an anthropocentric
manner. The topology of the cladogram is the same as in
Fig. 1. Accordingly, many untrained student of biology can
be expected to conclude that coelacanths are more closely
related to ray-finned fishes than to mammals.
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Fig. 3 Nine phylogenetic trees
over Mollusca with different
topologies. a was used as a
reference phylogeny. Students
were asked which of the eight
small trees were compatible
with the reference tree. The
eight topologies b–i differ from
a in either the phylogenetic
relationships displayed (making
them incompatible with a),
resolution of some of the
branches, placement of taxa
along the left–right axis, or a
combination of those (only c, g
and h are compatible with a. In
the tree distributed to students,
all names were given as
unabbreviated Norwegian
vernacular names)
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The students’ inability to answer question 1 (Fig. 1)
might be argued to have other reasons. An obvious alter-
native explanation would be that the error was caused by a
simple misunderstanding of the word ‘‘relationship’’, and
that it is sufficient to tell students that relationship, as used
in evolutionary biology, is a technical term meaning ‘‘the
relative recency of common ancestry’’ (Mayr 1974).
However, the question to the students was posed in Nor-
wegian, were the word ‘‘slektskap’’ only has the latter
meaning. In other words, while knowledge of the precise
meaning of ‘‘relationship’’ is necessary (especially in
English), it is not sufficient for students to understand
cladograms.
In passing I would like to mention a speculation on the
reason why phylogenetic systematics and cladistic meth-
odology was rather quickly accepted in Germany (Ax
1977; Remane 1956; Schlee 1969), but provoked intense
debates in English-language journals (verifiable with
almost any issue of Systematic Zoology from the 1970s). I
suspect that part of the problem was semantic. The German
word for ‘‘relationship’’ is ‘‘Verwandtschaft’’, but while the
English word has all kind of abstract and symbolic con-
notations, including overall similarity, the German term is
reserved for true, genealogical bonds (as is the Norwegian
‘‘slekt’’, see footnote 1). The statement that for instance the
lungfish is more closely ‘‘verwandt’’ to the cow than to the
salmon is quite uncontroversial in German. On the other
hand, the statement that the lungfish is more closely related
to the cow than to the salmon, was able to create a heated
discussion—which was only peripherally concerned with
the actual phylogeny of the groups concerned (Gardiner
et al. 1979; Halstead 1978; Halstead et al. 1979).
A final observation concerns the importance attributed
to Linnean categories (i.e. labels such as ‘‘family’’,
‘‘order’’, etc.) by students. It is well-established that Lin-
nean categories above the species level do not carry
information, that they are not comparable across taxa, and
that it is entirely arbitrary to which taxa they are assigned
in the first place (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1992; Donoghue
2001; Ereshefsky 1994, 2001, 2002). Many taxonomists
have abandoned categories altogether, simply referring to
taxa by their names. However, few students are aware of
the arbitrariness of Linnean categories. In many under-
graduate text books, the enumeration (!) of animal ‘‘phyla’’
or insect ‘‘orders’’ seems to be more important than the
discussion of interrelationships between the taxa concerned
(e.g. Barnes et al. 1998). This leaves students with the
impression that categories must express something. Unless
told otherwise, they tend to make up their own explana-
tions. As my results indicate, only a tiny proportion of
students seems to question the existence and reality of
Linnean categories. Of course, blank answers to question 2
do not necessarily indicate the deliberate rejection of cat-
egories—the two students may also have wished to give a
number, but were unable to ‘‘recall the correct one’’. On the
other hand, question 2 was clearly a leading (not to say,
loaded) question, which may have biased the respondents
into thinking that a number was the only acceptable
answer. Still, findings from question 3 show that at least
27% of the students perceive the distinction between
‘‘orders’’ and ‘‘classes’’ to be a reflection of real differences
between natural levels of organisation.
The findings presented here re-enforce earlier reports
that reading cladograms is an ability that has to be prac-
ticed (O’Hara 1992, 1997). Even though the transition from
developmental thinking to tree thinking is more or less
completed in the science of systematics at the collective
level, it has to be accomplished anew by every generation
of biology students on the individual level. This must not
be forgotten when teaching phylogenetics or writing or
illustrating text books. Other topics that need to be
addressed explicitly are the artificiality of Linnean cate-
gories, the non-existence of stem taxa, and the arbitrariness
of paraphyla. It does not seem to be sufficient to ‘‘get the
facts right’’ in teaching and text books. Students tend to fall
back to group and developmental thinking unless explicitly
told otherwise.
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